EX PARTE JOHN MERRYMAN.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

In the United States Circuit Court, Chambers, Baltimore,
Maryland. Before Taney, Chief Justice.
EX PARTE JOHN MERRYMAN.
1. By the English Constitution Parliament alone has power to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus.
2. By the Constitution of the United States, Congress only has power to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus, and such power does not reside in the President. Per
TA EY, Chief Justice.
3. The Fourteenth Section of the Judicary Act of 1789, relating to the constitutional privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, discussed and interpreted.
4. The history of the habeas corpus act in England and in the United States.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
CH. J.-The application in this case for a writ of habeas
corpus is made to me under the 14th section of the Judiciary Act
of 1789, which renders effectual for the citizen the constitutional
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. That act gives to the courts
of the United States, as well as to each Justice of thd Supreme
Court, and to every District Judge, power to grant writs of habeas
corpus, for the purpose of inquiry into the cause of commitment.
The petition was presented to me at Washington, under the impression that I would order the prisoner to be brought before me there;
but as he was confined in Fort McHenry, at the city of Baltimore,
which is in my circuit, I resolved to hear it in the latter city, as
obedience to the writ, under such circumstances, would not withdraw
Gen. Cadwalader, who had him in charge, from the limits of his
military command.
The petition presents the following case:-The petitioner resides
in Maryland, in Baltimore county. While peaceably in his own
house, with his family, it was, at two o'clock, on the morning of the
25th of May, 1861, entered by an armed force, professing to act
under military orders. He was then compelled to rise from his bed,
taken into custody, and conveyed to Fort McHenry, where he is
imprisoned by the commanding officer, without warrant from any
lawful authority.
TANEY,
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The commander of the Fort, General George Cadwalader, by
whom he is detained in confinement, in his return to the writ, does
not deny any of the facts alleged in the petition. He states that
the prisoner was arrested by order of Gen. Keim, of Pennsylvania,
and conducted as a prisoner to Fort McHenry by his order, and
placed in his (Gen. Cadwalader) custody, to be there detained as a
prisoner.
A copy of the warrant, or order, under which the prisoner was
arrested, was demanded by his counsel, and refused. And it is not
alleged in the return that any specific act, constituting an offence
against the laws of the United States, has been charged against
him upon oath ; but he appears to have been arrested upon general
charges of treason and rebellion, without proof and without giving
the names of the witnesses, or specifying the acts which, in the
judgment of the military officer, constituted these crimes. And,
having the prisoner thus in custody, upon these vague and unsupported accusations, he refuses to obey the writ of habeas corpus
upon the ground that he is duly authorized by the President to suspend it.
The case then, is simply this. A military officer, residing in
Pennsylvania, issues an order to arrest a citizen of Maryland, upon
vague and indefinite charges, without any proof, so far as appears.
Under this order his house is entered in the night; he is seized
as a prisoner, and conveyed to Fort McHenry, and there kept in
close confinement. And when a habeas corpus is served on the
commanding officer, requiring him to produce the prisoner before a
Justice of the Supreme Court, in order that he may examine into
the legality of the imprisonment, the answer of the officer is, that
lie is authorized by the President to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus at his discretion, and, in the exercise of that discretion, suspends it in this case, and on that ground refuses obedience to the
writ.
As the case comes before me, therefore, I understand that the
President not only claims the right to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus himself, at his discretion, but to delegate that discretionary
power to a military officer, and to leave it to him to determine
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whether he will or will not obey judicial process that may be served
upon him.
No official notice has been given to the courts of justice, or to
the public, by proclamation or otherwise, that the President claimed
this power, and had exercised it in the manner stated in the return.
And I certainly listened to it with some surprise, for I had supposed it to be one of these points of constitutional law upon which
there was no difference of opinion, and that it was admitted on all
hands that the privilege of the writ could not be suspended, except
by act of Congress.
When the conspiracy, of which Aaron Burr was the head, became
so formidable, and was so extensively ramified as to justify, in Mr.
Jefferson's opinion, the suspension of the writ, he claimed, on his
part, no power to suspend it-but communicated his opinion to Congress, with all the proofs in his.possession, in order that Congress
might exercise its discretion upon the subject, and determine
whether the public safety required it. And in the debate which
took place upon the subject, no one suggested that Mr. Jefferson
might exercise the power himself, if in his opinion the public
safety demanded it.
Having therefore regarded the question as too plain and two well
settled to be open to dispute, if the commanding officer had stated
that upon his own responsibility, and in the exercise of his own discretion, he refused obedience to the writ, I should have contented
myself with referring to the clause in the Constitution, and to the
construction it received from every jurist and statesman of that
day, when the case of Burr was before them. But being thus
officially notified that the privilege of the writ has been suspended
under the orders and by the authority of the President, and,
believing, as I do, that the President has exercised a power which
he does not possess under the Constitution, a proper respect for the
high office he fills requires me to state plainly and fully the grounds
of my opinion, in order to show that I have not ventured to question the legality of his act without a careful and deliberate examination of the whole subject.
The clause in the Constitution which authorizes the suspension
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of the privilege of 'the writ of habeas corpus, is in the ninth section of the first article.
This article is devoted to the Legislative Department of the
United States, and has not the slightest reference to the Executive
Department. It begins by providing "that all legislative powers
therein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,
which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives."
And after prescribing the manner in which these two branches of
the Legislative Department shall be chosen, it proceeds to enumerate specifically the legislative powers which it thereby grants, and
legislative powers which it expressly prohibits, and, at the conclusion of this specification, a clause is inserted, giving Congress "the
power to make all laws which may be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any department or office thereof."
The power of legislation granted by this latter clause is by its
words carefully confined to the specific objects before enumerated.
But as this limitation was, unavoidably, somewhat indefinite, it was
deemed necessary to guard more effectually certain great cardinal
principles essential to the liberty of the citizen, and to the rights of
and equality of the States, by denying to Congress, in express
terms, any power of legislating over them. It was apprehended, it
seems, that such legislation might be attempted, under the pretext
that it was necessary and proper to carry into execution the powers
granted, and it was determined that there should be no room to
doubt where rights of such vital importance were concerned, and,
accordingly, this clause is immediately followed by an enumeration
of certain subjects to which the powers of legislation shall not
extend; and the great importance which the framers of the Constitution attached to the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to protect the liberty of the citizen, is proved by the fact that its suspension, except in cases of invasion and rebellion, is first in the list of
prohibited powers-and, even in these cases, the power is denied
and its exercise prohibited, unless the public safety shall require it.
It is true that in the cases mentioned, Congress is, of necessity, the
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judge of whether the public safety does or does not require it ; and
its judgment is conclusive. But the introduction of these words is
a standing admonition to the legislative body of the danger of suspending it, and of the extreme caution they should exercise before
they give the Government of the United States such power over the
liberty of a citizen.
It is the second article of the Constitution that provides for the
organization of the Executive Department, and enumerates the
powers conferred on it, and prescribes its duties. And if the high
power over the liberties of the citizens now claimed was intended to
be conferred on the President, it would, undoubtedly, be found in
plain words in this article. But there is not a word in it that can
furnish the slightest ground to justify the exercise of the power.
The article begins by declaring that the Executive power shall
be vested in a President of the United States of America, to hold
his office during the term of four years-and then proceeds to prescribe the mode of election, and to specify in precise and plain
words the powers delegated to him and the duties imposed upon
him. And the short term for which he is elected, and the narrow
limits to which he is confined, show the jealousy and apprehensions
of future danger which the framers of the Constitution felt in relation to that department of the Government, and how carefully they
withheld from it many of the powers belonging to the Executive
branch of the English Government, which were considered as dangerous to the liberty of the subject-and conferred (and that in
clear and specific terms) those powers only which were deemed
essential to secure the successful operation of the Government.
He is elected, as I have already said, for the brief term of four
years, and is made personally responsible, by impeachment, for
malfeasance in office. He is from necessity and the nature of his
duties, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, and of the
militia, when called into actual service. But no appropriation for
the support of the army can be made by Congress for a longer
term than two years, so that it is in the power of the succeeding
House of Representatives to withhold the appropriation for its support, and thus disband it, if in their judgment the President used,
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or designed to use it for improper purposes. And although the
militia, when in actual service, are under his command, yet the
appointment of the officers is reserved to the States as a security
against the use of the military power for purposes dangerous to the
liberties of the people or the rights of the States.
So, too, his powers in relation to the civil duties and authority
necessarily conferred on him are carefully restricted, as well as
those belonging to his military character. He cannot appoint the
ordinary officers of Government, nor make a treaty with a foreign
nation or Indian tribe, without the advice and consent of the
Senate, and cannot appoint even inferior officers unless he is authorized by an aot of Congress to do so. He is not empowered to
arrest any one charged with an offence against the United States,
and whom he may, from the evidence before him, believe to be
guilty ; nor can he authorize any officer, civil or military, to exercise this power, for the fifth article of the amendments to the Constitution expressly provides that no person "shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"-that is,
judicial process. And even if the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus was suspended by act of Congress, and a party not subject
to the rules and articles of war was afterward arrested and imprisoned by regular judicial process, he could not be detained in
prison or brought to trial before a military tribunal, for the article
in the amendment to the Constitution immediately following the
,one referred to-that is, the sixth article-provides that "in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defence."
And the only power, therefore, which the President possesses,
where the "life, liberty, or property" of a private citizen is concerned, is the power and duty prescribed in the third section of the
8
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second article, which requires "that he shall take gare that the
laws be faithfully executed." He is not authorized to execute them
himself, or through agents or officers, civil or military, appointed
by himself, but he is to take care that they be faithfully carried
into execution as they are expounded and adjudged by the co-ordinate branch of the Government, to which that duty is assigned by
the Constitution. It is thus made his duty to come in aid of the
judicial authority, if it shall be resisted by force too strong to be
overcome without the assistance of the Executive arm. But in
exercising this power, he acts in subordination to judicial authority,
assisting it to execute its process, and enforce its judgments.
With such provisions in the Constitution, expressed in language
too clear to be misunderstood by any one, I can see no ground
whatever for supposing that the President, in any emergency, or
in any state of things, can authorize the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of h7abeas corpus, or arrest a citizen, except in aid of
the judicial power. He certainly does not faithfully execute the
laws if he takes upon himself legislative power by suspending the
writ of habeas corpus-and the judicial power also, by arresting.
and imprisoning a person without due process of law. Nor can
any argument be drawn from the nature of sovereignty, or the
necessities of Government for self-defence in times of tumult and
danger. The Government of the United States is one of delegated
and limited powers. It derives its existence and authority altogether from the Constitution, and neither of its branches, Executive, Legislative, or Judicial, can exercise any of the powers of
Government beyond those specified and granted. For the tenth
article of the amendments to the Constitution, in express terms,
provides that "the powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the ieople."
Indeed, the security against imprisonment by Executive authority, provided for in the fifth article of the amendments of the Constitution, which I have before quoted, is nothing more than a copy
of a like provision in the English Constitution, which had been
firmly established before the Declaration of Independence.

EX PARTE JOHN MERRYMAN.

Blackstone, in his Commentaries (1st vol., 137,) states it in the
following words:
"To make imprisonment lawful, it must either be by process
from the Courts of Judicature or by warrant from some legal officer having authority to commit to prison." And the people of the
United States, who had themselves lived under its protection while
they were British subjects, were well aware of the necessity of this
safeguard for their personal liberty. And no one can believe that
in framing a Government intended to guard still more efficiently
the rights and the liberties of the citizens against Executive encroachment and oppression, they would have conferred on the President a power which the history of England proved to be dangerous
and oppressive in the hands of the Crown, and which the people
had compelled it to surrender after a long and obstinate struggle
on the part of the English Executive to usurp and retain it.
The right of the subject to the benefit of the writ of habeas
corpus, it must be recollected, was one of the great points in controversy during the long struggle in England between arbitrary
government and free institutions, and must therefore have strongly
attracted the attention of statesmen engaged in framing a new,
and, as they supposed, a freer Government than they had thrown
off by the revolution. For, from the earliest history of the common law, if a person was imprisoned-no matter by what authority--he had a right to the writ of habeas corpus to bring his case
before the King's Bench; and if no specific offence was charged
against him in the warrant of commitment, he was entitled to be
forthwith discharged; and if an offence was charged which was
bailable in its character, the Court was bound to set him at liberty
on bail. And the most exciting contests between the Crown and
the people of England, from the time of Magna Charta, were in
relation to the privilege of this writ, and they continued until the
passage of the statute of 81st Charles II., commonly known as
the great habeas corpus act. This statute put an end to the
struggle, and finally -and firmly secured the liberty of the subject
from the usurpation and oppression of the Executive branch of
the Government. It nevertheless conferred no new right upon the
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subject, but only secured a right already existing. For although
the right could not justly be denied, there was given no effectual
remedy against its violation. Until the statute of the 13th of
William III., the Judges held their offices at the pleasure of the
King, and the influence which he exercised over timid, time-serving and partisan judges, often induced them, upon some pretext or
other, to refuse to discharge the party, although he was entitled to
it by law, or delayed their decisions from time to time, so as to
prolong the imprisonment of persons who were obnoxious to the
King for their political opinions, or had incurred his resentment
in any other way.
The great and inestimable value of the habeas corpus act of the
31st Charles II., is that it contains provisions which compel courts
and judges, and all parties concerned, to perform their duties
promptly, in the manner specified in the statute.
A passage in Blackstone's Commentaries, showing the ancient
state of the law upon this subject, and the abuses which were practised through the power and influence of the Crown, and a short
extract from Hallam's Constitutional History, stating the circumstances which gave rise to the passage of this statute, explain
briefly, but fully, all that is material to this subject.
Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the laws of England, (3d
vol. 133, 134,) says:
"To assert an absolute exemption from imprisonment in all
cases, is inconsistent with every idea of law and political society,
and in the end would destroy all civil liberty, by rendering its
protection impossible.
"But the glory of the English law consists in clearly defining
the times, the causes, and the extent, when, wherefore, and to
what degree the imprisonment of the subject may be lawful. This
it is which induces the absolute necessity of expressing upon every
commitment the reason for which it is made, that the Court upon
a habeas corpus may examine into its validity, and according to
the circumstances of the case, may discharge, admit to bail, or
remand the prisoner.
"And yet early in the reign of Charles L, the Court of King's
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Bench, relying on some arbitrary precedents (and those perhaps
misunderstood,) determined that they would not, upon a habeas
corpus, either bail or deliver a prisoner, though committed without
any cause assigned, in case he was committed by the special command of the King, or by the Lords of the Privy Council. This
drew on a parliamentary inquiry and produced the Petition of
Right (8 Chas. I.,) which recites this illegal judgment, and enacts
that no freeman shall hereafter be imprisoned or detained. But,
when in the following year, Mr. Selden and others were committed
by the Lords of the Council in pursuance of his Majesty's special
command, under a general charge of 'notable contempts, and stirring up sedition against the King and the Government,' the judges
delayed for two terms (including also the long vacation) to deliver
an opinion how far such a charge was bailable. And when at
length they agreed that it was, they, however, annexed a condition
of finding securities for their good behavior, which still protracted
their imprisonment, the Chief Justice, Sir Nicholas Hyde, at the
same time declaring that 'if they were again remanded for that
cause, perhaps the Court would not afterward grant a habeas
corpus, being already made acquainted with the cause of the
imprisonment.' B"ut this was heard with indignation and astonishment by every lawyer present, according to Mr. Selden's own
account of the matter, whose resentment was not cooled at the
distance of four-and-twenty years."
It is worthy of remark, that the offences charged against the
prisoner in this case, and relied on as a justification for his arrest
and imprisonment, in their nature and character, and in the loose,
vague manner in which they are stated, bear a striking resemblance
to those assigned in the warrant for the arrest of Mr. Selden. And
yet, even at that day, the warrant was regarded as such a flagrant
violation of the rights of the subject, that the delay of the timeserving judges to set him at liberty upon the habeas corpus issued
in his behalf, excited the universal indignation of the bar. The
extract from Hallam's Constitutional History is equally impressive and equally in point. It is in vol. 4, p. 14.
"It is a very common mistake, not only among foreigners, but
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many from whom some knowledge of our constitutional laws might
be expected, to suppose that this statute of Charles I. enlarged in
a great degree our liberties, and forms a sort of epoch in their history. But though a very beneficial enactment, and eminently
remedial in many cases of illegal imprisonment, it introduced no
new principle, nor conferred any right upon the subject. From the
earliest records of the English law, no freeman could be detained
in prison, except upon a criminal charge, or conviction, or for a
civil debt. In the former case, it was always in his power to demand of the Court of King's Bench a writ of habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum, directed to the person detaining him in custody, by
which he was enjoined to bring up the body of the prisoner with
the warrant of the commitment, and remand the party, admit him
to bail, or discharge him, according to the nature of the charge.
This writ issued of right, and could not be refused by the Court. It
was not to bestow an immunity from arbitrary imprisonment, which
is abundantly provided for in the Magna Charta, (if, indeed, it
were not more ancient,) that the statute of Charles II. was enacted,
but to cut off the abuses by which the Government's lust of power,
and the servile subtlety of Crown lawyers, had impaired so fundamental a privilege."
While the value -set upon this writ in England has been so great
that the removal of the abuses which embarrassed its enjoyment
has been looked upon as almost a new grant of liberty to the subject, it is not to be wondered at that the continuance of the writ,
thus made effective, should have been the object of the most jealous
care. Accordingly, no power in England short of Parliament can
suspend or authorize the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
I quote again from Blackstone (1 Comm., 136): "But the happiness of our Constitution is, that it is not left to the Executive
power to determine when the danger of the State is so great as to
render this measure expedient. It is the Parliament only, or legislative power, that, whenever it sees proper, can authorize the Crown
to suspend the habeascorpus for a short and limited time, to imprison suspected persons without giving any reason for so doing."
And if the President of the United States may suspend the writ,
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then the Constitution of the United States has conferred upon him
more regal and-absolute power over the liberty of the citizen than
the people of England have thought it safe to intrust to the
Crown-a power which the Queen of England cannot exercise at
this day, and which could not have been lawfully exercised by the
sovereign even in the reign of Charles the First.
But I am not left to form my judgment upon this great question
from analogies between the English government and our own, or
the Commentaries of English Jurists, or the decisions of the English courts, although upon this subject, they are entitled to the
highest respect, and are justly regarded and received as authoritative by courts of justice. To guide me to a right conclusion, I have
the commentaries on the Constitution of the United States of the
late Mr. Justice Story, not only one of the most eminent jurists of
the age, but for a long time one of the brightest ornaments of the
Supreme Court of the United States, and also the clear and authoritative decisions of that Court itself, given more than a half century since, and conclusively establishing the principles I have above
stated.
Mr. Justice Story, speaking in his Commentaries of the habeas
corpus clause in the Constitution, says:
"It is obvious that cases of a peculiar emergency may arise,
-which may justify, nay, even require the temporary suspension of
any right to the writ. But as it has frequently happened in foreign
countries, and even in England, that the writ has, upon various
pretexts and occasions, been suspended, whereby persons apprehended upon suspicion have suffered a long imprisonment, sometimes from design, and sometimes because they were forgotten, the
right to suspend it is expressly confined to cases of rebellion or
invasion, where the public safety may require it. A very just and
wholesome restraint, which cuts down at a blow a fruitful means of
oppression, capable of being abused in bad times to the worst of
purposes. Hitherto no suspension of the writ has ever been authorized by Congress since the establishment of the Constitution. It
would seem, as the power is given to Congress to suspend the
writ of habeas corpus in cases of rebellion or invasion, that the
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right to judge whether the exigency had arisen must exclusively
belong to that body :" 3 Story's Com. on the Constitution, section
1836.
And Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of ex parte Bollman and Swartwout, uses
this decisive language in 4 Cranch, 95 :
"It may be worthy of remark that this act (speaking of the one
under which I am proceeding,) was passed by the first Congress of
the United States sitting under a Constitution which had declared
' that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should not be suspended unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public
safety might require it.' Acting under the immediate influence of
this injunction they must have felt, with peculiar force, the obligation of providing efficient means by which this great constitutional
privilege should receive life and activity; for if the means be not
in existence the privilege itself would be lost, although no law for its
suspension should be enacted. Under the impression of this obligation, they give to all the courts the power of awarding writs of
habeascorpus."
And again, in page 101:
"If at any time the public safety should require the suspension
of the powers vested by this act in the courts of the United States,
it is for the Legislature to say so. The question depends on political considerations, on which the Legislature is to decide. Until
the legislative will be expressed, the Court can only see its duty,
and obey the laws."
I can add nothing to those clear and emphatic words of my great
predecessor.
But the documents before me show that the military authority in
this case has gone far beyond the mere suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. It has by force of arms thrust aside
the judicial authorities and officers to whom the Constitution has
confided the power and duty of interpreting and administering the
laws, and substituted military government in its place, to be administered and executed by military officers. For at the time these
proceedings were had against John Merryman, the District Judge
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of Maryland, the Commissioner appointed under the act of Congress, the District Attorney, and the Marshal, all resided in the
city of Baltimore, a few miles only from the home of the prisoner.
Up to that time there had never been the slightest resistance or
obstruction to the process of any court or judicial officer of the
United States in Maryland, except by military authority. And if
a military officer or any other person had reason to believe that the
prisoner had committed any offence against the laws of the United
States, it was his duty to give information of the fact, and the evidence to support it, to the District Attorney, and it would then
have becdme the duty of that officer to bring the matter before the
District Judge or Commissioner; and if there was sufficient legal
evidence to justify his arrest, the Judge or Commissioner would
have issued his warrant to the Marshal to arrest him; and upon
the hearing of the party would have held him to bail, or committed
him for trial, according to the character of the offence as it appeared
in the testimony, or would have discharged him immediately, if
there was not sufficient evidence to support the accusation. There
was no danger of any obstruction, or resistance, to the action of
the civil authorities, and therefore no reason whatever for the interposition of the military. And yet, under these circumstances, a
military officer, stationed in Pennsylvania, without giving any
information to the District Attorney, and without any application
to the judicial authorities, assumes to himself the judicial power in
the District of Maryland ; undertakes to decide what constitutes
the crime of treason or rebellion; what evidence, (if, indeed, he
required any,) is sufficient to support the accusation and justify the
commitment; and commits the party, without having a hearing
even before himself, to close custody in a strongly-garrisoned fort,
to be there held, it would seem, during the pleasure of those who
committed him.
The Constitution provides, as I have before said, that " no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." It declares that "the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no waraant shall
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issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." It provides that the party accused
shall be entitled to a speedy trial in a court of justice."
And these great and fundamental laws, which Congress itself,
could not suspend, have been disregarded and suspended, like the
writ of habeas corpus, by a military order, supported by force of
arms. Such is the case now before me, and I can only say, that if
the authority which the Constitution has confided to the judiciary
department and judicial officers may thus, upon any pretext, or
under any circumstances, be usurped by the military power at its
discretion, the people of the United States are no longer living
under a government of laws, but every citizen holds life, liberty
and property at the will and pleasure of the army officer in whose
military district he may happen to be found.
In such a case my duty was too plain to be mistaken. I have
exercised all the power which the Constitution and laws confer on
me, but that power has been resisted by a force too strong for me
to overcome. It is possible that the officer who has incurred this
grave responsibility may have misunderstood his instructions and
exceeded the authority intended to be given him. I shall, therefore, order all the proceedings in this case, with my opinion, to be
filed and recorded in the Circuit Court of the United States for the
District of Maryland, and direct the Clerk to transmit a copy,
under seal, to the President of the United States. It will then
remain for that high officer, in fulfilment of his Constitutional obligation, to " take care that the law be faithfully executed," to determine what measure he will take to cause the civil process of the
United States to be respected and enforced.

CROOKER vs. CROOKER, ET ALS.

In the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
CHARLES CROOKER, IN EQUITY, VS.

WM. D. CROOKER, ET ALS.

1

1. In equity, the creditors of an insolvent co-partnership have a right to the payment of their claims out of the partnership property, superior to the right of
creditors of an individual member. All the members of a co-partnership have a
joint interest in its property, while the interest of each, as a separate member,
is his share of the surplus remaining after the payment of the partnership
debts.
2. And the implied trust or pledge, 'which each member of the partnership has,
that its property shall be applied to the payment of its debts, extends, as well
to the real estate which has been purchased for partnership uses, 'with the funds
of the partnership, as to stocks, chattels, or debts; notwithstanding the real
estate may have been conveyed by such a deed as, under our statutes, would,
at law, make the partners tenants in common.
3. And where the creditors of one of the members of a co-partnership had instituted suits at law against him, and attached his legal interest in real estate thus
conveyed, intending to levy thereon to satisfy their judgments, 'when rendered,
the Court, in the exercise of its chancery powers, will interpose to protect the
rights of the other partners, when the estate attached will be required to pay
the debts of the firm, (including the firm's liabilities to its individual members,)
and, if without it, the partnership will be insolvent.

Exceptions from the ruling of

MAY,

J.

BILL IN EQUITY.

The plaintiff set forth in his bill that, in the
year 1826, he formed a co-partnership with William D. Crooker of
Bath, under the name and style of 0. & W. D. Crooker, upon an
understanding and agreement to share the losses and divide the
profits of the co-partnership business equally between them. Said
co-partnership was from time to time engaged in the buying and
selling of merchandise, the building and sailing of ships, the cutting and marketing of lumber, and other business, until the nineteenth day of June, 1854, when said co-partnership was dissolved.
That on said nineteenth day of June, aforesaid, said co-partnership was owing debts to a large amount, which are still outstanding
'This case will be found in 46 Maine Rep. 250.
May for the advance sheets.-[Ed. Am. Law Beg.

We are indebted to

Mr. Justice
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and unpaid, and that the assets of said co-partnership consists
mainly of parts of certain ships, and of parcels of land.
Said parcels of land were all purchased on the credit and with
the moneys of said co-partnership, bnt were conveyed to himself
and the said William D., to have and to hold to them, their heirs
and assigns, as tenants in common; and the legal title in and to
said lands is now vested one-half in himself, and the other half in
the said William D. Crooker.
That certain persons and corporations, [thirty in all, whose names
are given,] on certain days [named in the bill,] sued out of the
Supreme Judicial Court of this State writs of attachment against
the said William D. Crooker, directed to the sheriffs of the several
counties of the State, and their deputies, and bearing date respectively of the several days aforesaid, and caused all the right, title,
and interest of the said William D. in the parcels of land aforesaid,
to be attached. All of said suits were commenced for the recovery
of debts cofitracted and incurred by the said William D. on his
own separate and individual account and credit, and in the prosecution of business in which the said Charles had no concern or
interest. The exact aggregate amount of said debts your orator
is unable to state, but, upon information and belief. avers it to be
between twenty-five and forty thousand dollars.
That the plaintiffs in the aforesaid suits have threatened, and he
believes it to be their intention, to obtain satisfaction of the judgments which have been or may hereafter be rendered in said suits,
by levying their executions upon the legal estate of the said William
D. in the parcels of land aforesaid, and he fully believes and avers
that, if saild intention be carried into effect, one-half of the assets
of said co-partnership will be absorbed by the payment of the
separate and individual debts of the said William D., and that the
remainder and residue thereof will be utterly insufficient to pay
and discharge the just debts and liabilities of said co-partnership.
That he (plaintiff) has already been obliged to pay debts of said
co-partnership to a large amount, out of his separate and individual
property; that he has repeatedly urged said William D. to come to
a settlement with him of the partnership accounts and dealings,
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and join with him in selling the co-partnership property, and paying the co-partnership debts. All of which the said William D.
has neglected and refused to do.
That he has no adequate remedy at law, and therefore prays that
the said William D., and the plaintiffs in the aforesaid suits at law
against him, may be required, upon their several and respective
oaths, full, true, direct, and perfect answers to make to all and
singular the matters and things hereinbefore stated and charged
that the plaintiffs aforesaid may be restrained from satisfying the
judgments, which have been or may be rendered in the aforesaid
suits, by sale of any interest in the property of said co-partnership,
or by levy on the estate of said William D. in the parcels of land
aforesaid; and that said attachments may be dissolved; that a receiver may be appointed; that the said William D. may be required
to join your orator in conveying to him all the aforesaid land, and
all other property of said co-partnership; that he may be ordered
to sell and dispose of the same, and out of the avails thereof to pay
and discharge the debts of said co-partnership, and the balance to
pay over as this honorable Court shall direct; and that your orator
may have such further relief in the premises as the nature of his
case may require, and to your honors shall seem meet and proper.
William D. Crooker did not appear; and a portion only of the
parties named as plaintiffs in the several suits at law, appeared.
Such as had entered their appearance on the docket filed general
demurrers to the bill; and, at April Term, 1858, MAY, J., ruled
proforma, that the demurrers be sustained and the bill be dismissed.
Plaintiff thereupon excepted.
Bradbury, Morri7l Meserve, and Rogers, for the plaintiff.
Bron8on, for Lincoln Bank; Bath Mutual Marine Insurance Co.;
and Hyde, Farrar & Co., defendants.
Fes8enden & Butler, for Casco Bank, defendant.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
MAY, J.-As between the principal respondent, Win. D. Crooker,
and the orator, this is a case where the latter seeks, by his bill, to
compel the adjustment of the affairs of a co-partnership of long
standing between them, but which was dissolved June 19, 1854.
'
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The bill seeks to do this by causing the co-partnership property,
both real and personal, to be applied, through the agency of a
receiver, to the payment of the partnership debts. The said Win.
D. Crooker having failed, after notice to appear and answer, the
bill is to be taken pro confesso as against him. The decree, however, to which the orator is entitled, cannot properly operate upon
property, even though it belong to the co-partnership, in which
other persons have acquired a better right or higher equities; and
a receiver, if appointed, can only take the co-partnership effects as
subject to all such superior claims.
Of the other numerous respondents, declared against in the
bill, nine only have appeared. The others, upon whom due notice
has been served, by neglecting to appear and answer, are properly
to be regarded as consenting to such a decree against them as is
sought in the bill.
The principal question, therefore, which arises, is whether those
respondents who have appeared and filed their several demurrers to
the bill, ought in equity, in view of all the facts alleged in the bill
and admitted by the demurrers, to be restrained in their legal efforts
and attempts to satisfy certain judgments, which they have, or may
hereafter obtain against the said Win. .D. Crooker for his sole
debts, out of the parcels of land which are described in the bill, and
claimed as partnership property. The solution of this question
depends upon the facts and principles of equity jurisprudence applicable thereto.
The bill charges that a co-partnership between Charles and Win.
D. Crocker was formed in 1826; that it was engaged from time to
time in the buying and selling of merchandise, the building and
sailing of ships, the cutting and marketing of lumber, and other
business; that it was dissolved in June, 1854; that, at the time of
its dissolution it was owing debts to a large amount, which are still
outstanding and unpaid; that the assets of the co-partnership consist, mainly, of parts of certain ships, and of parcels of land, which
were purchased on the credit and with the moneys of said copartnership, but were conveyed to the said Charles and Win. D.
Crocker, their heirs and assigns, as tenants in common; that these
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respondents have caused the same lands to be attached upon their
several writs against Win. D. Crooker, for his private debts; and
that these creditors of said Win. D. have threatened, and said
orator believes it to be their intention, to obtain satisfaction of the
judgments which have been or may be rendered in said suits, by levying their executions upon the legal estate of said Win. D. Crooker
in said lands; and, further, that if said intention shall be carried
into effect, one-half of the assets of said co-partnership will be absorbed by the payment of the separate and individual debts of the
said Win. D. Crooker, and the remainder and residue thereof will
be utterly insafficient to pay and discharge the just debts and liabilities of said co-partnership. The bill further charges, that the"
said orator has already been obliged to pay debts of said co-partnership, to- large amount, out of his separate and individual property;
and that he has repeatedly urged the said Win. D. Crooker to come
to a settlement with him of the co-partnership accounts and dealings, and to join with him in selling the en-partnership property
and paying the co-partnership debts; all which the said Win. D.
has neglected and refuses to do. Such are the admitted facts in
the case.
In regard to the established principles of equity jurisprudence
applicable to partnership property, it is now well settled that the
creditors of a co-partnership, in case of insolvency, are to be
deemed as having a priority of right to payment out of such property, which may be enforced before the claims of the creditors of
a separate partner. The interest of the co-partnership in such
property is joint, while each individual partner, as such, is entitled
only to his share of what may remain after the co-partnership debts
are paid. This preference being generally disregarded at law, can
be effected only by means of the equity which the partners have
over the whole funds: Story on Equity, vol. 1, § 675, and cases
there cited; Jackson vs. Cornell, 1 Sandf. Ch. R. 348; Jarvis vs.
.Broolcs, 3 Foster, 136; Fall River JFhaling Co. &- als. vs. Borden, 10 Cush. 458; Murrill vs. Nill, 8 How. 414; Douglass al. vs. Winslow, 20 Maine, 89; Cropper & al vs. Coburn &.al., 2
Curtis, 465.
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It is also true that each partner is regarded as having an equitable lien upon the whole partnership property for the payment of
the partnership debts. Commercial Bank vs. Wilkins, 9 Maine,
28. This lien, or, as it is sometimes more appropriately called,
implied trust or pledge, reaches the whole partnership property,
whether it consists of lands, or stock, or chattels, or debts. Real
estate, purchased with partnership funds and for partnership uses,
is, for the purposes of equity, regarded as standing upon the same
footing as personal estate: Peck & al. vs. .Fisher,7 Cush. 386.
Each partner is entitled to regard the whole estate as held for
his indemnity against the joint debts, and as security for the ultimate balance which may be due to him for his own share of the
partnership effects: Story on Equity, vol. 2, § 124B3; Rozie vs.
Carr, 1 Sumner, 173; Buchan vs. Sumner, 2 Barb. -Ch. R.
198-199.
In relation to real estate, when it is a part of the partnership
effects, it is to be treated in equity, to all intents and purposes, as
a part of the partnership funds; and, whatever may be the form of
the conveyance, it will be held subject to all the equitable rights
and liens of the partners which would apply to it if it were personal estate; and this rule prevails notwithstanding the legal title
may, by the death of the particular party holding it, have been
cast by descent upon his heirs at law, 1 Story's Eq., § 674, and
cases there cited; Dyer vs. Clark, 5 Met. 562. Such is the rule,
also, notwithstanding the estate may have been conveyed to the
partners by such a deed as, under our R. S. of 1841, c. 91, § 13,
and the revision of 1857, c. 73, § 7, would, at law, make them tenants in common: Burnside vs. Merrick, 4 Met. 537; Howard vs.
Priest,5 Met. 582; Fall River Whalihz Co. & als. vs. Borden,
10 Cush. 458, before cited. Nor does it make any difference that
the deed contains no reference upon its face to the grantees as
partners: Tillinghast vs. Champlin & al., 4 Ames' (R. I.) R. 173.
No reason is perceived why that same equity which may be
invoked for the protection of a partner in cases of actual insolvency,
may not also be successfully invoked in cases of threatened insolvency, when it is apparent from the facts that, unless the contem-
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plated acts which are threatened, are restrained, the result must be
an actual insolvency: Deveau vs. Fowler, 2 Paige's Ch. R. 400.
In cases of this kind, we have no doubt that the equity powers of
the court may as properly be exercised to prevent a wrong, as for
the purpose of making an equitable appropriation of such effects
as may remain after the wrong has been perpetrated, or has in any
way happened. As between these partners, then, we find no difficulty, upon the principles of general equity and the facts conceded
in the case, in coming to the conclusion that the bill is well-sustained;
and, under our revised statutes of 1841, c. 96, § 10, and the revision of 1857, c. 77, § 8, by which equity jurisdiction is conferred
upon this court in all cases of partnership, the orator is well entitled, upon the facts, to a decree against the said William D. Crooker,
such as is sought by the bill; "and would be equally so entitled if
the said William ID. Crooker had appeared and demurred to the
bill.
While such are the equitable rights and remedies which exist
between Charles and William D. Crooker, as partners, and such
the power of this court to enforce these rights, as between them, it
is equally clear, in view of the authorities which have been cited,
and many others that, might be, that, at law, the title to the real
estate attached by the sole creditors of William D. Crooker, was in
him at the time of the attachments. In fact, the bill admits that
he was seized as tenant in common with said Charles Crooker, of
the legal estate in all the parcels of land which were attached.
Nothing appears upon the face of the deeds conveying said lands
to them, nor upon any record in the case, that said lands were in
any way connected with the partnership affairs, or that they were
paid for, or, when purchased, were to be paid for with partnership
funds. No partnership lien or trust, even by implication, exists
upon the face of the deeds, or any of them. The bill, however,
charges that they were, in fact, partnership assets, and this is
admitted by the demurrers in the case. Under such circumstances
the right of the creditors of William D. Crooker, at law, to attach,
and levy their executions when obtained, upon his undivided moiety
of these lands, in satisfaction of his private debts, cannot be ques35
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tioned: Blake vs. Nutter, 19 Maine, 16. "Whether a different
rule should be adopted in equity inthis State," says WESTON, 0. J.,
in the qase last cited, "the court is not at present called upon to
determine. When such a case arises in equity, it will be matter of
grave consideration what effect the express terms of our statute is
to have upon the question." The statute here referred to is that of
1821, c. 31, § 1, which is found to be, in substance, the same as our
statute now in force, c. 78, § 7,and the statute of 1841, c. 91,
§ 13, both of which are before cited. The question to which 0. J.
WESTON

here alludes, has now arisen.

It is now contended by the several counsel in defence, for the first
time in this State, that, notwithstanding the lands attached may, in
fact, belong to the co-partnership, and may be needed for the payment of outstanding co-partnership debts, and for any balance
which may, upon the final adjustment of the affairs of the firm,
be found to be due to either partner; and notwithstanding they
may, in equity, as between these partners be treated as co-partnership assets; still the legal estate, being apparently held as the individual estate of each of these partners, and so appearing upon the
records in the registry of deeds, is liable to attachment and levy
upon execution by any judgment creditor of either partner, for his
sole debts, to the extent of such partner's apparent legal interest
in the lands. It is said, that it would be manifestly unjust to allow
partners to hold real estate in their own names and as their separate
estate, and, upon the strength of such apparent ownership, to contract individual debts, and then to withhold from such individual
creditors the right to attach and levy their executions upon the
same lands which induced them to give individual credit, notwithstanding it may afterwards be made fully to appear that such lands
were in fact a part of the co-partnership effects; There is, undoubtedly, great weight in the suggestion, and, if this were a question
affecting in its application merely the rights of the partners, it
would deserve the most serious consideration. The same objection
would apply with equal force to the personal estate of the co-partnership, when it should happen to be in the possession of one of
the partners, such possession being, by law, prima facie evidence of
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title in such partner, and thereby furnishing an apparent basis for
individual credit. It would, therefore, be equally unjust to restrain
the creditor of the individual partner from satisfying his debt out
of the personal estate of the firm, when so held, before the implied
trust, which the partnership relation creates, has been discharged.
But so long as the partnership debts are unpaid, and the partners
severally have a right to have the partnership property appropriated
for the purposes of the co-partnership, and the fulfilment of such
obligations as ncessarily spring from that relation, if all or either
of the partners have the sole custody or legal title in them of any
property, which, in equity, belongs to the co-partnership, there is,
as all the authorities show, a resulting trust in relation to such property, which, under appropriate circumstances, may be enforced by
any particular member or by the creditors of the firm, the latter
working out their security through the equities of such member.
It is this trust which this court, sitting as a Court of Equity, will
enforce ; and no reason is suggested or perceived why tenants in
common, whether made so by force of the statute or otherwise, may
not take an estate in trust. where the trust results from implication
of law, as well as any other grantee. Giving, therefore, to the
statute, the whole force which is claimed for it in defence, we find
nothing in its language or purpose to cut off the equities resulting
from any of the conveyances to which it relates.
Whenever, therefore, there is, as in the case before us, a resulting trust in favor of any person or persons, growing out of any
conveyance of partnership property, whether it be made in severalty or to tenants in common, such trust will be respected and
enforced in the same manner as similar trusts in other cases, notwithstanding the record may show an absolute legal title in the
grantee, unless the estate has been alienated in such a way by the
trustee as to cut off the trust, or unless the law has, in some other
mode, provided for its extinguishment. So long as such trust exists
in relation to the partnership property, where the co-partnership is
insolvent, or evidently to be made so by a levy upon the property,
a judgment creditor of one of the partners in the firm cannot levy
his execution except upon the contingent interest of such partner
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in the partnership effects : Smith vs. Barker & al., 10 Maine, 458.
This rule is, in itself, so proper, so advantageous to commercial
interests, and so conducive to the safety of creditors and persons
entering into the partnership relation, and so much in accordance
with natural justice, that it ought not be broken in upon for slight
reasons.
Do, then, our statutes, in relation to the attachment and levy of
executions upon real estate, so far affect the rights of the cestuis
que trust, in cases such as we are considering, that a creditor, who
has legally attached such estate as the property of the trustee
acquire, by force of his attachment and the record title of the
land, a better right or higher equity than the cetui3 que trust possess? In other words, does such a creditor, by his proceedings,
acquire such a right to proceed and complete his levy upon the legal
interest of the -trustee, for his sole debt, that the- court is thereby
deprived of all power to compel the execution of the original trust?
Ordinarily the attachment of property, whether personal or real, in
which the debtor has the legal interest, creates a lien which the
attaching creditor may enforce as against all other persons. It is
so in all cases, at law, where there are no outstanding equities which
a court of general equity will enforce, and where the party making
the attachment has no notice of any defect in the debtor's title at
the time when the attachment is made. Thus, where goods are
attached while in the hands of a fraudulent purchaser by a creditor
ignorant of the fraud, and before the vendor has exercised the right
which the law gives him of rescinding the contract of sale within a
reasonable time after the discovery of the fraud, such creditor will
be upheld in his right to levy upon the goods, even as against the
defrauded vendor. The reason is, because the rights of both parties depend upon the law, and upon the law alone. So, too, in
cases where there is an attachment of real estate, which the debtor
has conveyed, and the deed of the grantee has not been recorded,
the creditor, if he had no actual notice at the time of the attachment, of the conveyance, will be legally entitled to levy upon such
estate notwithstanding the claims of the grantee.
On the other hand, where there are outstanding equities or trusts,
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-which a court of equity will enforce, the attaching creditor is not
regarded as acquiring, by force of his attachment merely, any
right which is in its nature higher than the equitable rights which
exist. These will be regarded as subsisting until the attachment
is perfected by a judgment and levy, notwithstanding the creditor
may have had no knowledge of their existence when his attachment
was made. Thus, in cases of foreign attachment, when the funds
in the hands of the trustee have been equitably assigned, prior to
the service of the writ, even though both tile creditor and the
trustee were in fact then ignorant of the assignment, still such
funds will be protected against the attachment, upon notice from
the assignee to the trustee being stated in his disclosure at any
time before judgment; and the reason is, because the outstanding
equities are regarded as higher in their nature than the legal
estate.
The provisions of the present statute in relation to trusts, c.73,

§ 12, and the R. S. of 1841, c. 91, § 32, may also be regarded as
having an important bearing upon this question. By the present
statute, it is provided that "the title of a purchaser for a valuable
consideration, or a title derivedfrom levy of an execution, cannot be
defeated by a trust, however declared or implied by law, unless the
purchaser or creditor had notice thereof." The statute of 1841,
just cited, though different in its phraseology, when taken together,
was evidently intended to convey the same meaning as the present revision. . By these statutes, there is a strong implication that
a trust, whether declared by some instrument in writing, or, as in
the present case, implied by law, will not be cut off, except by a
sale of the estate or a levy upon execution.
In the case of a creditor without notice of the trust, it is the
levy, and not the attachment, which gives him protection against
the trust. The respondents, therefore, by virtue of their attachments, have acquired no such rights in the lands which we find, in
view of the facts, to be held by Charles and Win. D. Crooker as
tenants in common, in trust for the partnership purposes, as can
properly prevent this Court, when sitting as a court of equity,
-fom interposing to protect the orator, and, through him, the part-
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nership creditors, against an appropriation of the partnership property, which will be to their injury and in violation of the trust ;
and this rule, we think, is in harmony with the principles of general
equity: 3 Kent's Com. 65 ; Evans vs. Chism & al., 18 Maine, 220.
In the case of the Commercial Bank vs. Wilkins, before cited,
the outstanding equities of a co-partnership and its creditors were
held to be a justification to an officer for not selling, upon execution, personal estate which had been attached by such officer at the
suit of a creditor of one of the partners. Why, then, should not
equity intervene to prevent a misappropriation of such property to
the injury of any partner or the creditors of the firm ?
That, in such cases, the equities springing out of the co-partnership are superior, and properly held "to bear down the letter of the
law," when invoked at any time before the sale of the property has
taken place, upon the execution against the individual partner,
seems to have been settled in the case of Thompson vs. Lewis
Trustee, 27 Maine, 167.
No reason is perceived why the same rule should not be extended to real estate. It is the law of other States. In the case
of Peck
al. vs. Fisher, 7 Cush. 386, before cited, the contest
related to the title to real estate, which had been held by two partners as tenants in common, and levied upon as the individual property of such partners; and then, subsequently, for a partnership
debt. The action was a writ of entry, and it appeared that the
creditors of the individual partners held, or claimed tb hold, by the
earliest attachment. But, notwithstanding such creditors had an
indefeasible title at law, which might be defeated in equity, and as
it was understood an equity suit was pending, the Court suspended
the case to await the result of that suit.
So, in New Hampshire, a subsequent attachment by the creditors
of a firm overrides the earlier attachment of a creditor of one of
the members of the firm: Tappan vs. Blaisdell, 5 N. H., 190;
and, in the case of Jarvis d' al., Adm'rs, vs. Brooks & al., 7 Foster, 87, the facts are found to be, in many respects, very similar to
the facts in the case now before us, and yet it was held that a levy
upon real estate belonging to a co-partnership, and held by its indi-
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vidual members as tenants in common, in trust, not by deed upon
its face, but by implication of law, for the firm and'its creditors,
was valid against a prior attachment of the same property, as the
individual property of the separate members of the firm. "The
partnership creditors, having precedence, nothing more is requisite than that they should have a valid execution properly levied,
in order to avail themselves of their right of priority, and this
follows as a necessary result of the principle that their claim is
superior to that of the creditors of the individual members of the
firm." No rights were, therefore, acquired by the previous attachment which was not defeated by the subsequent levy made by the
creditors of the firm. If such a levy would protect the rights of
the partnership creditors, no reason is perceived why the same
rights, and the rights of the moving partner, may not be protected
in the equity suit before us.
In the case of Tillinghast vs. ( iamplin &' als., before cited from
the Rhode Island Reports, AMES, C. J., while treating of the
equitable lien which is created upon partnership property in favor
of partners and co-partnership creditors, in a case where the deed
was precisely like the deeds before us, a deed to the partners, as
tenants in common, and contained no reference to their relation
as partners, says, "this lien is, we think, familiarly administered
in equity, in favor of those respectively entitled to it, upon their
own direct application, and as their own equitable right. Even
the courts of law administer it in New England, under our attachment laws, in case of quasi insolvency, by giving to the creditor
of the firm, though subsequently attaching the firm property, a priority of lien and payment upon and out of such property, over the
separate creditor of one of the co-partners first attaching it, thus
setting aside the legal right of prior attachment in favor of the
equitable lien of the co-partnership creditors, upon the co-partnership property.
In view of our statute authorizing the attachment of real estate,
we do not think it was intended, when taken in connection with the
statute for the protection of trust estates, resulting from implication, which has been cited, to overthrow and destroy the equitable
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rights arising therefrom, provided the ce8tuis que trust took the
proper steps to secure their rights before a levy upon execution.
Thus we are brought to the conclusion that the equities which
attach to partnership property, whether personal or real, are not
absorbed in the legal estate, until such property has been transferred
to a bona fide holder, ignorant of the trust, either by a sale or upon
execution. Equity will, therefore, enjoin or restrain the appropriation of such property to the payment of the debts of an individual
partner, until the partnership debts are paid, and the indemnity to
which the other parties are entitled is obtained, and the attaching
creditors in this case cannot hold by virtue of their attachments,
until the equities springing out of the partnership relation are
satisfied. But this contingent interest may be protected for them
by an appropriate decree.
The other objections to the bill, such as want of due diligence
and certainty in its allegations, in the judgment of the Court, are
not sustained. The result is that, upon the facts as stated, the orator
is entitled to a decree, not only as against his co-partner, Win. D.
Crooker, but also against the attaching creditors, named as
respondents in the bill, to be made in accordance with the principles
of equity before stated; and the exceptions which are taken to the
pro forma rulings of the presiding judge at Mii Priu8, all of
which were made without examination, and only for the purpose of
presenting such questions of law and equity as might arise in the
case, to the full Court, are sustained; and the case is remanded to
the Court within and for the county of Sagadahoc, where the
respondents, whose demurrers have been overruled, can answer
further if they shall desire.
Exceptions sustained.
TENNEY, C. T., and RiCE, GoODENOW, and Divis, J. J., con-

curred.
APPLETO.

and CUTTING, J. J., did not concur.

HANFORD vs. PAINE.

In the Ohittenden County Supreme Court-lJanuaryTerm, A. D.
1860.
GEO. T. HANFORD vs. STEPHEN PAINE AND HIS TRUSTEE, JUSTUS EDSON.
1. The Legislature of a State has the right, in the absence of any constitutional
provisions to the contrary, to prescribe any formalties in the conveyance of personal property which it may deem expedient, and to make such provisions universal in their applications to all who hold propertyin the State, as well those
residing without as within the State's territory.
2. Personal property is generally regarded as having no 8itus; its title, mode of
transfer, and all incidents connected with its transmission are regulated by the

law of the owner's domicil.
3. A voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors, if made in accordance with
the law of the assignor's domicil, is effective to pass the personal property of
such assignor wherever situated, unless restrained by some local law.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
REDFIELD, Oh. J.-The general question involved in this case is
one of a good deal of practical importance, and one in regard to
which there is, obviously, more or less conflict among the decisions
in other States.
There are some points in regard to which we think there is no
just ground of controversy. We see no good reason why any
different rule should be applied to this case, because of the extent
and variety of the property involved. It would be difficult, if not
impossible, to define a rule upon this subject, resting upon any such
basis. All would agree, we believe, that if the assignor had been a
resident of the State, at the date of the assignment, and had gone
out of the State for the purpose of making the assignment, or
being temporarily out of the State, he had made the assignment, in
either case, it must still be governed by the requirements of our
law in relation to such contracts. Any other view would operate a
virtual fraud upon the law.
But if the assignor has a bona fide residence out of the State, we
do not perceive why his contract of assignment may not, with the
same propriety, be held to convey his interest in his mercantile
partnership, as in any single article of personal property within the
State, or a chose in action, owing from one resident here.
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We feel that there can be no question in regard to the right of
the legislature to restrict and limit the freedom of alienation of
personal chattels, or of choses in action, within the State, or to
prohibit it altogether, or even to provide for its escheat to the
State, after the decease of the present proprietors, unless restricted
by constitutional limitations. And, by parity of reason, the legislature must have the right to prescribe any formalities, in the conveyance of personal property, which they may deem expedient, and
to make them universal in their application to all who hold property
here, as well those residing without, as within the State. There
can be no doubt of the power of the legislature in this respect.
That was never questioned.
But it has long been the policy of commercial States not to
embarrass the free transmission of the title to personal property.
And it has been very justly considered as discourteous and illiberal
policy, in one State to abridge and fetter the operation of foreign
contracts within its limits, or to refuse to enforce them by suits
maintained in its Courts, or to embarrass foreign owners of personal
estate within its limits, in the free enj3yment of its beneficial use,
or its ready and unrestricted conveyance. Hence Courts have
long felt a reluctance to establish any restrictions of this character
by means of construction merely. But when such is the fair and
reasonable interpretation of a statute, the Courts can feel no delicacy, and no reluctance in the matter.
I. The great and leading question made in the argument of this
case is, whether the statute of 1852, in relation to assignments for
the benefit of creditors, was meant to apply to all such contracts
intended to operate. upon personal property within the State,
wherever such assignments might be executed. It must be very
obvious, to any one examining the special provisions of the statute
of 1852, that it could only have been intended, primarily, to apply
to cases where the assignor resided within the State, and where the
assignment was to be here carried into effect by the assignees.
By the third section, it is made the duty, both of the assignor and
the assignee, to file in the office of the county clerk, in the county
where the assignment is made, and the property assigned is situated,
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a true copy of the assignment, and of the inventory, &c. By the
sixth and seventh sections provision is made for compelling the
assignee to give account of his administration of the trust, by
proceedings before "the Chancellor of the Circuit." None of the
provisions in these sections, which constitute one-third of the statute,could have any possible application to an adjustment made out of
the State. The statute, without these provisions, would be a very
lame and imperfect affair. And the fifth section, which provides
for the assignee filing with the "clerk of such county," a "copy of
the settlement of his trust account," must also be regarded as having
exclusive reference to transactions conducted within the State. It
is, therefore, sufficiently obvious that this statute could not have
been intended primarily to apply to assignments made, and to be
carried into effect, without the State. It seems to me as obvious
that this statute was not intended to apply to assignments made
out of the State, as if the statute had, in terms, provided that all
assignments hereafter made in this State, &c.
But it may still be urged that this statute must be regarded as
applicable to all property within the State, personal as well as real.
But it seems to us that, as no such thing is expressed in the act, it
would be contrary to the general policy of commercial States to
adopt such a view, by construction merely. The inclination of
Courts, and the general policy of the law, is certainly otherwise.
In the law, personalty is generally regarded as having no situs.
Its title, mode of transfer, and other incidents connected -with its
use and transmission, are regulated according to the law of the
place of the domicil of the owner. This is confessedly true, in
regard to the requisite formalities, in the execution of a will of
personalty, although essentially departing from the requirements of
the law of the State, where such property happens to be situated
at the time of the decease of the owner. It is the law of the place
of the domicil of the owner which must control these incidents, as
to the operation of wills upon personal estate, and also the distribution of intestate estates, according to the general rules of international comity among civilized and commercial States. There
can be no doubt of the right of any State to interfere in these
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matters, even to the extent of prohibiting the operation of foreign
wills within their limits. But that is seldom attempted in modern
days.
But it is claimed that, in regard to the distribution of one's
effects, while living, among his creditors, a different rule, to some
extent, has prevailed. This may be true, perhaps. One State is
not bound to send property found within its limits abroad, to be
administered upon, either by assignees, whether voluntary or compulsory, or by personal representatives, after death, so long as
there are creditors within the State, who would thereby be deprived
of an equal share with the creditors in the place of the domicil of
the debtor. This is the express rule of this State, in regard to
insolvent estates of deceased persons, domiciled abroad. And we
see no reason why, upon general principles, we might not expect
the same rule to obtain in regard to the effects of living insolvents.
But there are, no doubt, many considerations to be taken into the
account, in determining such a question. It has been held, that in
giving effect to an assignment for the benefit of creditors, made
out of the State, we act upon considerations of comity merely.
This must, undoubtedly, be received with some qualification. It is,
certainly, not true that we could regard the binding effect of such
an assignment, in regard to personal property remaining within the
State, as dependent upon the question whether the State where
such assignment was made would give effect to an assignment made
in this State, as to property in that State. That would certainly
be a very narrow and unmanly view of the subject. For this might
result merely from a misconception of the law by the Courts of
that State, and a misapplication of the principles which, according
to the generally admitted doctrines of commercial law, ought to
have controlled the question. The view proposed would then
amount to nothing less than the law of retaliation, the lex talionis.
Shaw, Ch. J., Means vs. .Hapgood, 19 Pick. 107.'
The only ground which could fairly justify the Courts of one
State in refusing to recognize such- contracts made in other States,
by persons domiciled there, as matter of comity, must have reference either to a general want of confidence in the mode in which
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the general principles of commercial law are there administered,
which is but another name for the character and standing of such
State, in regard to civilization and christianity,-or it must have
reference to the manner in which we suppose our citizens would be
affected by sending them into the forum of that State for the
recovery of their claims against the assignor, in that particular
case.
We think this State, or any christian State might, perhaps, fairly
be justified in refusing to send its own citizens into Japan or China
to obtain payment of a claim against a person domiciled there, and
who had there made an assignment of his effects, provided those
citizens could obtain payment of such claims through the attachment
and sale of the property of such debtor remaining in the State
where the creditor resided.
And if any of the American States make, by their general laws,
such a discrimination in favor of their own citizens in the distribution of the effects of insolvents, either living or dead, as to amount
to a virtual denial of justice, or of equality of right in suich distribution to our citizens, we might fairly claim to apply such property
of the insolvent, as was found in this State, to the payment of such
debts as were owing to our citizens. Beyond this, it does not occur
to me that, upon principle, we could fairly be justified in making
any discrimination in favor of our own citizens. And neither of
these grounds would ordinarily find any basis for their application,
in regard to assignments made in any of the American States.
. The ground upon which Courts in our State have refused to give
effect to involuntary assignments, made in foreign States, under the
insolvent and bankrupt laws of such countries, is sufficiently justified,
upon the ground that such assignments are affected by the judgments of the Courts of such foreign States, and which can, of
course, have no effect either upon persons or property in other
States, of which they have no jurisdiction, unless it is effected by
transferring such property or persons into the States where such
Courts exist, and thus giving a sort of ex post facto jurisdiction.
This is sometimes done by persons abroad coming into the insolvent
Court and presenting their claims, and accepting a dividend upont
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them, 'with the general creditors. This makes the discharge a bar
to such claims, although the Court would have had no jurisdiction
over them if they had not been voluntarily presented. Peck vs.
Hibard,26 Vt. R. 698. As to the general principle that involuntary assignments, under foreign brnkrupt and insolvent laws, are
not binding upon persons or property situated without the States
-where made, the cases of Harrisohvs. Sterry, 5 Cranch. 289; Hoyt
vs. Thompson, 1 Selden, 820; Betton vs. Valentine, 1 Curtis, 168,
and 2 Kent Com. 405-408, and the cases cited by the learned
commentator, will be sufficient. The doctrine is most unquestionable, and rests upon grounds entirely aside of those affecting
voluntary asgignments,-that is, upon the want of jurisdiction in
the Courts making the judgment of compulsory assignment.
In regard to general voluntary assignments for the benefit of
creditors, it seems to be an admitted rule that, if made according
to the law of the place of the domicil of the assignor, they will have
the effect to pass all the personal property of the assignor, wherever
situated, unless their operation is limited or restrained by some
local law or policy of the State where the same is situated. Story's
Conflict of Law, § 423 a.; Burrill on Assignments, 363, et seq.
In the second edition of Burrill on Assignments, thorough and
exhaustive digest and analysis of the cases upon this subject will be
found pp. 363-372. A careful review of the cases shows very
clearly that the preponderance of authority is greatly in favor of
the general view above stated. This examination could scarcely
fail to bring all -fair-minded persons to the same conclusion with
this careful and pains-taking writer. This author says, that in all
the cases where a voluntary assignment valid where made, and
operative by the laws of the place of the domicil of the owner, to
transfer personal property everywhere, has not been held to have
that effect, as is the fact in some of the American States it has
been only in favor of the citizens of the States where such decisions
have been made. "As against citizens of other States, and
especially as against citizens of the State where the assignment
was made, the rule appears to hold without qualification, that an
assignment, valid by the laws of the State in which it is made, is
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valid everywhere." This limitation of the exception would narrow
its operation, so as not to include the plaintiff's claim in the present
case, he being not only not a resident of this State, but being a
resident of the State of New York when the assignment was made,
and the assignor domiciled at the time, and by the laws of which
State it is entirely valid to transfer all the personal property of the
assignor, wherever situate.
We do not desire, however, to have it understood that we are
willing to place our decision upon such narrow ground. We regard
that class of cases, which have assumed this ground in regard to
the citizens of other American States, by way of a specific and
narrow retaliation, or, what is still more ungenerous, for the purpose
of giving their own citizens an unequal advantage, as resting upon
no enlarged and liberal notions, either of national or general policy.
This is the view maintained by Shaw, Oh. J., in Reins vs. .aygood
and Trustee, 19 Pick. R1. 105-107. It is there said, "Courts of
law are competent to taka notice of general considerations of comity;
but it is not, we think, within their province to attempt to enforce
a precise system of retaliation, by adopting the precise rules against
their citizens which their Courts adopt against ours." The very
least which could fairly justify our Courts in discriminating in favor
of our own citizens, would be the certainty that the Courts of the
State, where the assignment was made, would do so in regard to
their own citizens, and thus deprive our citizens of that equal justice
whieh they are entitled to demand and to expect in all civilized
and commercial States. One may be compelled to do this, as to
barbarous and pagan States. We trust Vermont will only do it, in
the strictest sense, by way of necessary self defence.
The principle of the leading case in Massachusetts, Ingrahamvs.
Geyer, 13 Mass. R. 146, where the rule of discrimination in favor
of their own citizens, as to voluntary assignments of insolvents
made abroad, is first attempted to be maintained, is virtually condemned by the same Court, in the case of .eans vs. ffapgood, 19
Pick. R. 107, when it came under consideration as the decision
of a neighboring State. Shaw, Ch. J., there says, that the case of
Fox vs. Adams, 5 Greanleaf R. 245, "has been repeatedly doubted
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in this State." And this last case was decided expressly upon the
authority of Ingraham vs. Geyer, and is, in principle, the same.
All the other cases in the American States, wlhere voluntary
assignments, made in other States, have been held inoperative
against the attachment of personal property by citizens of their
own States, have gone upon the narrow and illiberal policy of giving
their own citizens an advantage over those of other States. That
has sometimes been alluded to by our own Courts, by way of argument or illustration, but it has not obtained countenance of late,
and certainly ought not to be encouraged, unless in strict self
defence.
The authority in the opposite direction is of far greater amount,
besides resting upon grounds which commend themselves both to
our sense of justice and consistency with principle. Carker vs.
Webster, 2 Wallace, Jr., 181; Law vs. Mills, 18 Penn. St. R. 185;
United States vs. Bank of United States, 8 Robinson La. R. 262;
Dundas vs. Bowler, 8 McLean R. 397.
The Massachusetts Court has, in many instances, and in comparatively recent times, Zipcey vs. Thomson, 1 Gray R. 243, repudiated the notion of giving effect to voluntary assignments by
insolvents, when they operated against their local legislation, or to
defeat attachments made by their own citizens; but they assign no
grounds or reasons for such a course, which would not equally
justify that State in disregarding all foreign contracts which seemed
unfavorable to their interests, or not in strict conformity with the
special provisions of their local law.
In Connecticut, Atwood vs. ProtectionInsurance Go., 14 Conn.
R. 555, such assignments are held valid to pass property in that
State, although not conforming to the specific requirements of their
law, very similar to many of the requirements of our assignment
law of 1852. So also, in New Hampshire, Sanderson vs. Bradford,
10 New H. 260.
We have thus disposed of all which could fairly be urged in favor
of holding the trustee liable in this State, unless it be the claim that
these provisions of our assignment law must be regarded by our
Courts as something pertaining to the settled policy of the State,
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in regard to the disposition of the effects of insolvents among
their creditors, or else that it was meant to attach to all such cohtracts intended to effect property here situated, wherever made.
But we think there is no plausibility in adopting either of these
views. We have said that these provisions of the statute are of a
character to indicate very clearly that they were designed to have
operation only upon assignments made within the State; and they
do not indicate any purpose of being applied to the property conveyed instead of the contract. They are regulations affecting a
particular class of contracts, and not the general mode of transferring personal property for the benefit of creditors. There is more
plausibility in the argument which attempts to apply them to all
assignments of property for the benefit of creditors, than in that
which would make them a portion of the fixed policy of the State,
in regard to the disposition of property for the payment of debts of
insolvent persons, whenever such property is found in the State,
like, for instance, our rule of law requiring a delivery of the property, in order to put it beyond the reach of process.
The Louisiana cases cited go upon this ground; but we are not
prepared to adopt this view even.
In every view which we are able to take of the case, we think
the trustee was properly discharged, and, consequently, judgment
is affirmed.

In the District Court for the City and County of Philadelpia.
MILLER VS. RIPKA.

The provision of the Pennsylvania Stay Law of May 21, 1861, directing the court to
order that no execution shall issue against a defendant except at the periods when
and in the proportions which it shall appear bya report of the prothonotary that
the majority of his creditors, whose demands exceed two-thirds of his or their
indebtedness, have agreed to extend the time of payment of the debts due them
respectively, is a violation of the Constitution of the United States and of the
State of Pennsylvania.

Rule to show cause why case should not be referred to the Prothonotary.
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The opinion of the Court was delivered by
SHARSWOOD, P. J.-This is a motion on behalf of the defendant,
under the provisions of the Act of 21st May, 1861, grounded upon
an affidavit that a majority in number and two-thirds in value of
their creditors- had agreed to give him an extension ; to refer it to
the Prothonotary to report the terms of such extension. Upon such
report being made, the act requires that the court shall order that
no execution shall be issued, except in conformity with the terms of
such extension.
The plaintiff in this case is one of the creditors who did not assent
to the extension, and opposes such reference and order as a violation
both of the Constitution of the United States and of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. By the tenth section of the first article of
the former, it is provided that "no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts ;" and by the seventeenth section of
article nine of the latter, "that no ex post facto law, nor any law
impairing contracts, shall be made."
It would be an affectation of learning to examine and discuss the
bearing of the numerous decisions which have been made in the Federal and State Courts, upon this fruitful head of constitutional jurisprudence. It #ill be enough to state as the result of these cases,
in brief, that legislation modifying or changing the remedies for
breach of contract, does not infringe upon the constitutional limitation, unless it practically takes away or denies the right. Thus, to
adduce an instance which seems at the same time fairly illustrative
of the extent of the principle and its limitations, the legislature may
shorten the period allowed by the statute of limitations for the commencement of actions, but not without giving some time for those
having causes of action not as yet barred by existing laws, to avoid
the effect of such limitation. It is undoubtedly competent for the
legislature to declare that the limitation of action upon a note or book
account shall hereafter be three years instead of six; but if they have
failed to provide that those having claims upon note and book
account, less than six and more than three years old, shall have the
right to commence their actions within a certain reasonable period,
the law, as to such cases, would be inoperative and void. In like
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manner, the rules of evidence may be changed by the legislature, but
not so as to destroy all remedy upon a subsisting valid contract.
It would not be competent for them to provide that no contract shall
be proved otherwise than by writing, or a subscribing witness, so as
to act retrospectively. And, without doubt, provision may be made
for delay in the prosecution of actions upon contracts, when such
provisions are intended to afford the parties the opportunity of a full
and deliberate bearing. Thus, the giving time for an appeal or writ
of error, or for a motion for a new trial, are clearly constitutional.
No doubt that laws have gone much further, and been upheld by the
courts. The line upon tfiis subject has not been drawn with that
accuracy which would have been desirable. It would have been better,
as Chancellor Kent has said, if the doctrine had been established,
that all effectual remedies, affecting the interests and rights of the
party, existing when the contract was made, became an essential
ingredient in it, and are parcel of the creditor's rights, and ought
not to be disturbed. The constitution meant to secure to every man
his property, so far as it depended upon contract, and it would be
a practical and flagrant violation of it to shut up the courts of justice
and deny him all remedy; and, if so, every provision which embarrasses
or delays him, without reference to ulterior proceedings connected
with the determination of the cause, must necessaaily fall within the
same principle. If you can abolish one process of execution, you
may abolish all. If you may exempt some portion of his property,
you may all. If you may suspend execution for one year, you may
for twenty, or forever.
Let us take, however, the actual decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States, as bearing directly upon the case before us,
and therefore forming an authoritative rule for us. In Bronsen vs.
Kinzie, 1 Howard, 311, and .iIcGraeken vs. Hfayward, 2 Id. 605,
it was held by them, that a law of the State of Illinois, providing
that a sale shall not be made of property levied on under an execution, unless it will bring two-thirds of its valuation, is, as to contracts
made prior to its passage, unconstitutional and void. "The obligation of a contract," says Justice Baldwin, in delivering the opinion
of the court, in the case last cited, "consists in its binding force on
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the party who makes it." This depends on the laws in existence
when it is made; these are necessarily referred to in all contracts,
and forming a part of them, as the measure of the obligation to perfrom them by the one party, and the right acquired by the other.
There can be no other standard by which to acertain the extent of
either, than that which the terms of the contract indicate, accordini
to their settled legal meaning; when it becomes consummated, the law
defines the duty and the right, compels one party to perform the
thing contracted for, and gives the other a right to enforce the performance by the remedies then in force. If any subsequent law
affect to diminish the duty, or to impair the right, it necessarily
bears on the obligation of the contract in favor of one party to the
injury of the other; hence, any law, which in its operation, amounts
to a denial or obstruction of the rights accruing by a contract, though
professing to act only on the remedy, is directly obnoxious to the
prohibition of the Constitution." This is the last decision of the
Supreme Court, and went further, and was more unequivocal in its
tone, than any one which preceded it.
It is true, that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, with these two
cases before them, decided that the Act of Assembly of 1842, which
provided for a stay of one year, in case the property levied on did not
bring two-thirds of its appraised value, was constitutional. (Jhadwiek
vs. Moore, 8 W. & S. 49. Chief Justice Gibson distinguishes that
law from the Illinois act, because it stayed the execution for a
reasonable time; at least, that it was not so unreasonable as to call
for judicial interposition. The case, he said, was by no means a
clear one, and to put it in a train for ultimate decision in the Suprme
Court of the United States, it was necessary for them to sustain the
constitutionality of the law, which they deemed it their duty to do
in all cases of doubt and difficulty. It would seem, according to
the scope of the opinion, that the legislature are to determine, in the
first instance, what is reasonable, subject to the review of the Supreme
Court. If the case before us were precisely the same, we would feel
bound to bow to this latest decision of our own immediate local
superior, but the provisions of the act before us are essentially
different. Two-thirds in value and a majority in number of the
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creditors, decide what is reasonable, and the act gives the court no
power to review their action. The stay ordered to be entered by
the court must be in precise conformity to that reported as the terms
of the agreement of the creditors. We cannot say that the act
is constitutional as to such agreements as we deem reasonable,
and unconstitutional as to such as we think unreasonable. Such a
matter cannot be the subject of judicial discretion. We have no
power to do what the legislature have not done-annex a proviso
that the stay shall not exceed a certain limit. If it be true that the
legislatue may grant a reasonable stay, it is not reasonable to leave
it to the decision of a majority in number and two-thirds in value
of the creditors-a tribunal not recognized by law, and which may
be unduly influenced in favor of the debtor. It must be competent
for the plaintiff in each case to deny the bonafides of the assenting
creditors; yet no provision is made by the law for the decision of
that question, unless it be by the prothonotary, and no power of
revision is given to the court over his determination.
On the whole, we are of opinion that this provision of the stay law
is so clearly and palpably unconstitutional, that we ought not to refer
the case before us to the Prothonotary.
Rule discharged.

Ln the New York Superior 0ourt-Special Term.
IN THE MATTER OF WILLIAM H. DOBBS, A MINOR.
1. Under the act of Congress relating to the Military Establishment of the United
States, the enlistment of a minor without the consent of his parent or guardian,
is void, and he can be discharged by the State authorities upon writ of habeas

corpuU.
2. Phelan's Case, 9 Abbott, 286, dissented from.

The opinion of the Court, in which the facts fully appear, was
delivered by
"MURRAY HOFFMAN,

J.-Upon habeas corpus, the return of an

officer of the United States Army is, that the party detained was
enlisted in the Army of the United States, on the twenty-eighth
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day of March last, for the period of five years; had received
advance, clothing, &c., to the value of $39.
Henry Dobbs, being examined upon this return, deposed that he
was the father of the party detained; that his son was a minor,
having been born on the 26th of February, 1841; and that he had
not given his consent to the enlistment in any form or manner whatever; and, also, that he, the father, was a citizen of the United States,
domiciled in Newark, New Jersey.
On these grounds the discharge of the party is applied for.
Congress has power, under the Constitution, to raise ana support
armies, article 1, sect. 8, sub. 11, and "to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces," Ibid. sub. 13,
and generally "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into execution the foregoing powers."
By the 11th section of the law of Congress of the 16th of March,
1802, vol. 2 Statutes at Large, p. 134, entitled "An act fixing the
military peace establishment of the United States," after declaring
that the recruiting officers should be entitled to receive for every
able-bodied citizen who should be enlisted for five years, between the
ages of eighteen and thirty-five years, the sum of two dollars, enacted
as follows: "Provided, that no person under the age of twenty-one
years shall be enlisted by any officer, or hired in the service of the
United States, without the consent of the parent, guardian, or master
first had or obtained, if any he have." It proceeds to impose a
penalty for violating this provision.
An act of April 12, 1808, (although considered obsolete, apparently expired by the limitation of the term of service provided in
it,) may be usefully referred to. By sect. 5, 2 Statutes at Large, p.
481, 483, the provisions of the act of 1802, "fixing the military
peace establishment of the United States," relating, among other
things, "to the regulation and compensation of recruiting officers,
age, size, qualifications, and bounties of recruits," were applied to all
persons and things within the intent and meaning of said act, the
same as if they were inserted therein at large."
The act of 26th June, 1812, vol. 2 Stat. at Large, p. 764, "for the
more perfect organization of the Army of the United States," is
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referred to on account of its adoption in the next mentioned act. It
does not itself contain anything pertinent to the present question.
By the act of January 20, 1813, vol. 2 Stat. at Large, p. 791,
entitled "An act supplementary to the act for the more perfect
organization of the Army of the United States," it was provided
in section five, that the recruiting officer should have a bounty of
.4 for every able-bodied citizen between eighteen and forty-five
years, and then proceeded: "Provided, that no person under the
age of twenty-one shall be enlisted, or held in service in the United
States, without the consent in writing of his parent, guardian, or
master, first had and obtained, if any he have."
The act of January 29, 1813, to raise an additional military force,
vol. 2 Stat. at Larg6, p. 794, to raise twenty regiments for one
year, contained precisely the same provision, sect. 7. This act has
become obsolete.
A further act was passed on the 10th of December, 1814, "making
further provision for filling the ranks of the Army of the United
States," vol. 3 Stat. at Large, p. 146. The first section authorized
the enlistment of any able-bodied men between the ages of eighteen
and fifty years: which enlistment shall be absolute and binding upon
all parties under the age of twenty-one years, as well as upon persons
of full age, such recruiting officer having complied with all the requisitions of the laws regulating the recruiting service."
By section 2, the recruit had four days to reconsider and withdraw his enlistment.
By section 3, so much of the 5th section of the act of the 20th
January, 1813, as requires the consent in writing of the parent,
guardian, or master, to authorize the enlistment of persons under
the age of twenty-one years, was repealed. The act was passed
before the peace was known in the United States. Then followed
an act of the 3d of March, 1815, entitled "An act fixing the military
peace establishment of the United States." By section 1, the
military peace establishment shall consist of such proportions of
infantry, &c., not exceeding ten thousand men, as the President
should judge proper.
By the 7th section, "the several corps authorized by the act shall

MATTER OF WILLIAM H. DOBBS.

be subject to the rules and articles of war, be recruited in the same
manner and with the same limitations as are authorized by the act of
16th March, 1802, entitled "An act fixing the military peace establishment of the United States," and the act of 12th April, 1808,
entitled, "An act to raise for a limited time an additional force ;"
the bounty to the recruiting officer was to be the same as it was by
the act of April 12, 1808.
I cannot but conclude that, by force of this section of the act of
1815, the provisions of the act of 1802 were restored as to the
necessity of a consent by the parent, and restored in the language
of that act.
The editor of the edition of the Statutes at Large (Mr. Peters)
considers the act of December 10, 1814, to b7 repealed by this act
of 1815, (marginal memorandum.) It probably is so, by the comprehensive provisions upon ihe same subject in the latter act.
Mr. Ingersoll, in his Digest of 1821, obviously considered the act
of 1802 as then in force upon this subject.
In an act of July 5, 1838, vol. 5, p. 256, "to increase the military
establishment of the United States," it was enacted, in section 80,
"that so much of the 11th section of the act of 16th March, 1802,
and so much of the 5th section of the act of 12th April, 1808, as fix
the height of enlisted men at five feet six inches, be repealed." This
raises a strong if not unanswerable argument that the rest of such
sections continued then in force.
I have not found any other statutory provision which bears upon
the question until the enactment of 28th September, 1850, hereafter noticed.
Whatever doubts Chief Justice Kent and Justice Story entertained of the right of State courts or judges to hold jurisdiction of
the matter, see 1 Mason, 86; 9 Johnson's Rep. 236, our Supreme
Court explicitly and fully recognized the power and the duty of the
State judges to give a detained party, enlisted under the laws of the
United States, the benefit of a habeas corpus. In the matter of
Carlton, 7 Cowen, 471, 1827, the courts declare that the enlistment
of a minor, without consent of his parent or guardian, was void under
the act of Congress, and he might be discharged by State authority.
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This doctrine has been acted upon by judges of this State, from
that time to the present. Indeed, it seems difficult to escape from
the imperative force of our own statute as to the writ of habeas
corpus, and the obligation to issue it. See 3d R. S., 563, sections
21, 26, 80.
Thus it seems to me the duty of considering the question as within
our jurisdiction, and the duty to discharge the prisoner on the facts
in this case is clear, unless the statute of September 28, 1850, prescribes another determination.
That statute is entitled, "An act making appropriations for the
support of the army for the year ending June, 1851," vol. 9, p. 504.
The fifth section directs "that it shall be the duty of the Secretary
of War to order the discharge of any soldier of the Army of the
United States, who, at the time of his enlistment, was under the age
of twenty-one years, upon evidence being produced to him that such
enlistment was without the' consent of his parent or guardian."
.Iam ready, as now advised, to concede the power of the Congress
of the United States, to withdraw the consideration of cases of this
description from the control of State courts or judges, and to prescribe the tribunals or officers to whom it shall be exclusively committed. But if the previous statements of the law in our State,
independent of this statute, are correct, (and this is beyond dispute,) then I cannot understand how the mere conferring of a power
in the matter upon one of the officers of the United States can
abolish the right and duty of the State Courts-can, indeed, be
anything but a concurrent power.
In an opinion of Mr. Attorney-General Crittenden, of March 28,
1851, vol. 5 of Opinions, p. 313, he considered that the Secretary
of War was not bound, by the act of 1850, to discharge a minor who,
at the time of enlistment, had neither parent nor guardian; that the
minor, having a parent or guardian, and enlisting without consent,
is not entitled during his minority to make proof and claim his own
discharge. The parent or guardian must concur in the application.
The law gives the enlisted minor no capacity to revoke the enlistment.
Mr. Attorney-General Cushing, vol. 6 of Opinions, p. 607, considered that the Secretary of War was not obliged, under the act of

